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Abstract  
Crowdwork is a novel form of digitally mediated work arrangement that is managed and organized 
through online labor platforms. This paper focuses on the governance of platforms that facilitate 
creative work—that is, complex work tasks that require high-level skill and creative workers. 
Crowdwork platform governance faces numerous challenges as a result of technology mediation, 
scalable and distributed workers, and temporary work arrangements. Creative crowdwork platforms, 
such as Topcoder, typically require additional governance structures to manage complex tasks. 
However, we know relatively little about creative crowdwork platform governance, as most existing 
studies focus on routine work platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Accordingly, this paper 
explores how incumbent and insurgent creative crowdwork platforms are governed under centralized 
and decentralized modes. We conducted a comparative case study based on the analysis of two 
different cases: Topcoder, a successful commercial platform with a largely centralized governance 
structure, and CanYa, an emerging innovative platform based on blockchain technology with more 
decentralized governance. We identified and classified different governance elements related to work 
control and work coordination. In addition, we explored the characteristics of creative crowdwork 
platform governance with different degrees of centralization. 
 
Keywords: Crowdwork Governance, Creative Crowdwork, Centralized Platforms, Decentralized 
Platforms, Blockchain, Tokenomics. 
1 Introduction 
Paid, online crowdwork refers to different types of remunerated digital work organized by means of 
online labor platforms, which are responsible for choosing, organizing, assessing and paying 
crowdworkers (Kittur et al., 2013). These platforms act as intermediaries between workers and job 
providers (Kittur et al., 2013; Deng et al., 2016). In order to manage the challenges of a distributed and 
scalable workforce, a governance structure is essential (Deng et al., 2016; Donini et al., 2017). 
Governance can help organize the relationships among the workers, platform, and job providers and 
ensure the long-term success of the ecosystem. In general, crowdwork platform governance refers to 
different policies, rules, and standards maintained on the platform (Deng et al., 2016, p. 281). 
Specifically, crowdwork platform governance includes control and coordination of platform resources 
and activities to help achieve the desired results (Gol et al., 2019). Control includes mechanisms such 
as quality control, a reputation system of workers and accountability of job providers, whereas 
coordination includes, for example, task management, incentive management, and contract 
management (Gol et al., 2019).  
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Crowdwork platform governance is plagued by many well-known challenges due to technology 
mediation, scalable and dispersed workers, and impermanent work arrangements (Gillespie, 2017). 
Furthermore, until now, most research on crowdwork platforms governance has focused on micro-task 
platforms like AMT. Broadly speaking, there are two types of crowdwork platforms: those for routine 
or micro-task work and those for non-routine or creative work (Gol et al., 2019; Margaryan, 2016). 
Routine work platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), involve micro-tasks, which are 
performed in seconds or minutes and are usually repetitive with no high level of skill requirement and 
minimal payment (e.g., tagging pictures) (Deng et al., 2016; De Stefano, 2016).  In contrast, creative 
work platforms, such as 99designs, Upwork, and Topcoder, involve more professional and creative 
tasks, such as graphic design and web development. These tasks take longer to accomplish, require a 
higher level of skill and provide higher compensation for the workers (Buettner, 2015; Margaryan, 
2016). The evidence suggests that such creative work platforms follow a considerably more complex 
governance structure than do routine work platforms like AMT (Vakharia & Lease, 2015). Meanwhile, 
with technologies such as blockchain making significant inroads, it has also become evident that 
crowdwork platform governance may be run in a centralized or a decentralized manner (Atzori, 2015; 
Gol et al., 2019; Hein et al., 2016). This trend may be especially important in creative work platforms 
where highly-skilled workers offer their services. Creative work inherently requires more discretion, 
suggesting that platform control mechanisms may need to be adjusted to account for the particular 
nature of such work. Accordingly, the important question this paper explores is how are creative 
crowdwork platforms governed under centralized and decentralized modes?  
This paper contributes to a better understanding of creative crowdwork platform governance under 
centralized and decentralized modes through a comparison of two case studies: Topcoder and CanYa. 
Topcoder is a long-standing (founded in 2001) and successful crowdwork platform that connects job 
providers with highly-skilled software developers, data scientists, and designers. The platform’s 
governance structure is largely centralized. CanYa is an emerging blockchain-based crowdwork 
platform (founded in 2015) that seeks to create multiple decentralized exchanges, one of which is 
CanWork, a marketplace through which highly-skilled freelancers can offer their services. Our 
findings demonstrate that there are significant differences between centralized and decentralized 
governance mechanisms related to platform control, work control and work coordination. For 
example, while centralized Topcoder is owned by shareholders (held by parent companies), 
decentralized CanYa is owned by CAN token-holders (CanYa community members). The distribution 
of work in centralized Topcoder is based on competition (Gol et al., 2018), while in decentralized 
CanYa, work is distributed through a marketplace that matches job providers with workers (CanYa 
Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). Moreover, Topcoder operates as a commercial company that maintains a 
community of workers and offers value-adding services to job providers to run complex jobs (Gol et 
al., 2018). Meanwhile, CanYa operates as an open source community and is only able to run relatively 
less complex jobs (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a; CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b). In sum, this 
paper offers one of the first steps towards developing a systematic understanding of creative 
crowdwork platform governance under centralized and decentralized modes. 
2 Theoretical Background 
Governance has been poorly defined in crowdwork studies, and a review of the literature shows a lack 
of studies on different crowdwork platform governance mechanisms, especially in the domain of 
creative work platforms (Deng et al., 2016; Donini et al., 2017; Margaryan, 2016). Moreover, the 
crowdwork phenomenon is still in the early stages of development, the associated practices are still 
forming, and the governance processes are still flexible (Nickerson, 2014). Broadly speaking, 
crowdwork platform governance refers to the coordination of interactions and the management of 
dependencies among all parties on the platform (based on Crowston, 1997; Howcroft & Bergvall-
Kåreborn, 2018; Schmidt, 2017), as well as the control of worker and job provider behaviour and the 
monitoring of their performance by means of rules, policies and standards (Deng et al., 2016; Manner 
et al., 2012).    
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Most research on crowdwork platforms and their governance assumes some degree of centralization is 
essential for successful governance (Vakharia & Lease, 2015). However, a few recent studies have 
emphasized that crowdwork platforms may be governed in a more decentralized manner—for 
example, by building on the ideas of worker-owned and -managed platforms (Gaikwad et al., 2015; 
Scholz, 2016). Centralized and decentralized modes of platform governance have different 
characteristics (Hein et al., 2016). Centralized governance can enable smoother coordination of 
workflows through central direction and a high level of control over workers’ behaviors and their 
submission quality (Brown & Grant, 2005; King, 1983), whereas decentralized governance can enable 
smoother coordination of contracts among parties as well as more efficient and fairer dispute 
resolution (avoiding a centralized bottleneck) (Tate et al., 2017). However, quality control of workers’ 
outputs has to be performed by costly consensus-based evaluation and will most likely depend on 
difficult-to-achieve, mutually agreed-upon standards (King, 1983). However, most of these specific 
governance mechanisms (e.g., quality control, dispute resolution, etc.) have not been studied across 
both centrally- and decentrally-governed crowdwork platforms. Thus, most of these advantages and 
disadvantages are assumed based on the general governance literature and lack empirical support. As 
such, this paper provides, to our knowledge, one of the first comparative investigations into 
crowdwork platform governance under centralized and decentralized modes. 
2.1 Blockchain for crowdwork platforms 
Current platform architectures support centralized governance by the platform owner. Decentralized 
crowdwork platform governance, thus, will rely not only on a different logic but also on a different 
technical architecture. Blockchain, a new distributed computing technology that is growing fast across 
industries, is currently considered the main contender for providing such an architecture. Through 
decentralized autonomous organizations (DAO), which function as business rules within smart 
contracts and possession rights listed on a blockchain, the envisioned possibility of decentralized 
governance (for crowdwork platforms and beyond) seems increasingly possible (Schweizer et al., 
2017). In the crowdwork context, new forms of decentralized platform infrastructure provided by 
blockchain technology can enable members to reach consensus on critical issues (e.g., the identity of 
job providers and workers, job completion and payment conditions, etc.), without the need for a 
central platform owner or other third parties to function as intermediary and trustworthy arbitrators 
(Schweizer et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2016). Hence, blockchain-based crowdwork platform governance 
could improve governance efficiency by automating payments through smart contracts (i.e., payments 
are executed automatically when the conditions stipulated in the contract are met); by managing 
dispute resolutions decentrally, thus avoiding bottlenecks; and by making it easier to create and 
manage job-specific smart contracts (Tate et al., 2017).  
3 Research Method 
This paper follows the research design of a comparative case study based on the analysis of two 
different cases, allowing for a comparison of centralized and decentralized creative crowdwork 
platform governance. In contrast to a single case study, a comparative case study provides the 
possibility to perform a comparison across contexts and thus to achieve more robust conclusions (Yin, 
2013). Specifically, we analyzed the Topcoder1 and CanYa2 platforms. We chose Topcoder because it 
is a successful creative crowdwork platform with a largely centralized governance structure. It works 
                                                     
1 According to Mike Morris, Topcoder CEO, the platform included 1.2 million freelance developers in December 2017, and 
thus figure is increasing by a rate of 50,000 software developers every quarter (Talley, 2017).  
2 According to CanYa community manager, the platform included 1300 freelance workers in August 2018 and is growing 
rapidly.  
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with many large companies such as IBM, Google, and NASA as job providers and attracts a large 
number of highly skilled workers. Topcoder holds online algorithm competitions as well as software 
development and software design competitions (Archak, 2010). As a comparison, we chose CanYa 
because it is an innovative platform based on blockchain technology. CanYa is an open ecosystem 
hosting a peer-to-peer service marketplace and includes decentralized applications using blockchain 
technologies (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). It is a member-owned, loosely organized entity that 
aspires to run as a DAO (i.e., decentralized autonomous organization). Consequently, relying on a lean 
organizational structure, CanYa expects to operate a profitable crowdwork platform with fees that are 
20 times lower than those of other crowdwork platforms (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). 
Therefore, these two cases illustrate two radically different governance modes and form an ideal 
setting to perform the desired comparison.  
3.1 Data collection and analysis 
In the Topcoder case, data were collected through 16 open-ended and semi-structured Skype 
interviews with staff, workers and job providers, conducted in February and March 2018. Each 
interview lasted approximately 40 to 50 minutes. In addition, online data were gathered from the 
platform website, from Topcoder forums, and from the Slack community channel which is used by 
workers and staff. In the CanYa case, data were collected through eight semi-structured Skype 
interviews with staff and workers. The approximate time for each interview was between 40 and 60 
minutes. Moreover, white papers about the platform were used as another important source of data. 
Furthermore, online data were gathered from the platform website, the CanYa blog and the Telegram 
community channel which is used by staff and workers. Detailed information regarding the 
interviewees is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Overview of Interviewees across Cases 
Building on the case study research strategy, we focused on the two cases to develop a richer insight 
into the dynamics of crowdwork platform governance in the underlying settings (Eisenhardt 1989). 
The purpose of the within-case analysis was to attain an understanding of the case stories and to 
perform analysis and organize data collection across the cases (e.g., making sure that data related to 
the same governance mechanism were available in each case). The data analysis within the two cases 
was accomplished using the same approach. We utilized the procedures presented by Huberman and 
Miles (1994) to perform qualitative data analysis. We performed iterative coding on the interview, 
documentary, and online data, initially via open coding and then by categorizing and altering the codes 
based on both data and theory. We coded for specific governance mechanisms related to control and 
coordination, as suggested both by the literature and the exploration of the data (e.g., reputation 





Role Area of Expertise 
Topcoder Worker 12 [P1…P12] Competitor, Co-pilot, Reviewer Development, Design and data 
science, Programming 
Staff 2 [P13, P14] Project manager, Community 
manager 
Development, Community 
Job provider 2 [P15, P16] Job provider Private Company 
CanYa Worker 3 [P17…P19] Developer, Designer, 
Accountant 
Development, Design, Accounting 
Staff 5 [P20…P24] Co-founder, CTO, Community 
Manager, Developer, Business 
Advisor 
Development, Community 
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skill, motivation, complaint handling, rewards, bonuses, and payments). New factors not mentioned in 
previous literature, such as dispute resolution and payment system, emerged from the data. We 
grouped the codes according to control and coordination as well as centralized and decentralized 
modes (see Table 2) to identify the most effective way of categorizing our findings.  
4 Findings 
Table 2 provides an overview of the identified governance mechanisms at play on creative crowdwork 
platforms with different degrees of centralization. We used the ideas of work control and work 
coordination to provide the basis for identifying and classifying different governance elements. In 
addition, the element of platform control emerged as an important distinguishing characteristic 
between Topcoder and CanYa. This separation of work governance and platform governance echoes 
Gillespie (2017), who argues that platform governance consists of two aspects: governance of and 
governance by platforms. Governance of platforms refers to the rules that guide platforms in their role 
as intermediaries (we refer to this as platform control), while governance by platforms refers to the 
platforms’ ability to mediate between sides, moderate content, and generally to coordinate and control 
the workflow (we refer to this as work control and work coordination). 
Table 2 reveals that, overall, remuneration in Topcoder is based on competition, which means that 
usually only a handful of people among those who work on a project are actually paid for their work 
(Gol et al., 2018). On the other hand, CanYa is a marketplace that matches job providers with workers, 
where job providers seek desired workers based on the skills advertised on their profiles and make 
contracts with them (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). Topcoder is a commercial enterprise; its 
business model relies on nurturing a community of workers and providing value-adding services to job 
providers by taking over the handling of complex jobs (Gol et al., 2018). Conversely, CanYa is an 
open source community and relies on community members (CAN token holders) to run the 
marketplace. Thus, it is not able to offer sophisticated or complex job handling services like those of 
Topcoder (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a; CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b).  
Specific governance elements provided particularly rich insights for comparison. For example, dispute 
resolution management, payment management and contract management served as rich entry points 
towards understanding decentralized governance, while task management and quality control served as 
rich entry points towards understanding centralized governance. As expected, we found that the 
platform owner plays a vital role in centralized crowdwork platform governance, whilemembers play a 
critical role in decentralized platform governance. We unpack each of the mechanisms in more detail 
in the table below. 
 












Platform Management  Corporate management and senior 
community members  
Community managers of the open 
source CanYa community (paid by 
CAN tokens)   
Platform Development  Developers employed by Topcoder Developers of the open source 
CanYa community (paid by CAN 
tokens)   
Equity Ownership  Shareholders (held by parent 
companies) 
CAN token-holders (held by the 











Remuneration Competition-based prizes and 
bonuses (only winners get paid) 
 
Payment on delivery (or as 
negotiated in advance)   
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Payment System Brokered and intermediated by the 
platform 
 
Direct payment via smart contracts 
(paid by CAN tokens) 
Quality Control Reviewer-based (prior to delivery; 
done by platform’s appointed 
reviewers)  
Not offered yet3  
 
 
Reputation System for 
Workers 
 














Task Management The platform provides end-to-end 
built-in work process management 
that is complemented by appointed 
project managers and co-pilots  
 
The platform provides only basic 




Managed by co-pilots   Not offered yet 
Contract Management Standard contract between 
platform and job providers, but no 
contract between platform and 
workers 
Platform-generated smart contracts 
between job provider and workers  
Dispute Resolution 
Management 
Arbitration by platform-appointed 
agent  
 
Arbitration by platform-appointed 
third-party community member 
Table 2. Creative Crowdwork Platforms Governance: Comparison of Topcoder and CanYa 
 
4.1 Governance of and by creative crowdwork platforms  
Governance by creative crowdwork platforms refers to the rules and policies that the platform uses to 
control and coordinate the workflow, user behaviors and content (Gillespie, 2017). Work control and 
coordination are vital for running a crowdwork platform (based on Crowston, 1997; Malone & 
Crowston, 1994; Kittur et al., 2013). Control performs the monitoring and guiding of processes within 
the platform (Schreieck et al., 2016) as well as verifying the compliance of workers’ and job 
providers’ behavior against standards, policies and platform objectives (based on Wiener et al., 2016). 
Coordination manages the dependencies among crowdwork activities, such as dependencies between 
tasks or between the parties (based on Crowston, 1997; Malone & Crowston, 1994; Kittur et al., 2013; 
Fernandes et al., 2018). Based on the literature and our data analysis, we suggest that work control 
includes financial remuneration, payment system, quality control, and the reputation system for 
workers. Meanwhile, work coordination involves task management, task interdependence 
management, contract management, and dispute resolution management. 
                                                     
3 ‘Not offered yet’ describes governance elements that CanYa does not currently provide but plans to offer in the future. 
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4.1.1 Platform control  
As highlighted above, we suggest that platform control consists of platform management, platform 
development, and equity ownership (Brown & Grant, 2005; Gawer, 2014; Denis et al., 2018).  
Platform management refers to the overall control over the platform environment and resources 
access, as well as the setting of standards and policies that guide all parties’ behaviors on the platform 
(Brown & Grant, 2005; Franke et al., 2011; Chard et al., 2016). Our data show that in Topcoder, 
platform management is performed by platform staff and senior worker community members (e.g., 
community managers and workers promoted to a co-pilot role). As a community manager described: 
“I’m the one who interacts with people and finds the issues they are facing on the platform” [P13]. On 
the other hand, in CanYa, which is an open ecosystem for peer-to-peer services and consists of 
decentralized applications powered via a DAO (decentralized autonomous organization), all members 
can be part of the system infrastructure and governance by getting a stake on the platform. Different 
levels of stakes involve different capabilities and responsibilities, and the members are also paid for 
doing platform management tasks (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). As explained by one of the 
platform staff: “What we are trying to do is to create an open ecosystem on the blockchain that allows 
people to be part of the system. So, if you stake with the CanYa system, then you can be part of the 
governance and structure. You can also be incentivized to do tasks within the system and get paid” 
[P20]. 
Platform development refers to who is allowed to develop and improve the platform regularly and to 
what extent (Gawer, 2014). On Topcoder, platform improvement capabilities are restricted to 
platform-employed developers. As mentioned by a co-pilot: “Topcoder’s developer team is working 
on improving the platform; for example, they are building a new program which is called MVB, for 
the new members to help them get started on the platform” [P5]. CanYa also has its own temporary 
development team, but it is moving towards becoming open-source-developed in the near future [P20, 
P22, P24] (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). Hence, any developers will be able to easily integrate 
new components, follow the platform style guide, join their application to the DAO and launch them 
(CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a).  
Equity ownership refers to the amount of the business assets owned by the business owner (Denis et 
al., 2018). Topcoder has shareholders, and the equity is held by parent companies.4 In contrast, CanYa 
equity is held by the CanYa token holders (i.e., community members who get a stake on the platform 
through buying CanYa tokens) (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b). Accordingly, any decision rights 
granted to equity owners are distributed differently in each of these platforms, as well as any financial 
benefits accrued.  
In sum, in centralized platform control, the platform owner plays a vital role in the governance of the 
platform, answering to shareholders. Conversely, in decentralized platform control, all members with a 
stake in the platform play a critical role in the governance of the platform and share the responsibility 
and accountability for its performance.  
4.1.2 Work control 
As highlighted above, work control involves monitoring and guiding processes within the platform 
(Schreieck et al., 2016) as well as verifying the compliance of workers’ and job providers’ behavior 
against standards and policies. We suggest that the distinguishing mechanisms of work control include 
financial remuneration, payment system, quality control, and the reputation system for workers.  
                                                     
4 Information retrieved from https://www.topcoder.com. 
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Financial remuneration is a key apparatus of creative crowdwork platform governance that controls 
workers’ behaviors by motivating them to take part in the crowdwork platform and by incentivizing 
them to deliver quality work (Harris & Wu, 2014; Gol et al., 2018). In Topcoder, financial 
remuneration is competition-based. The platform hosts weekly cash prize competitions in algorithm, 
design, and software development fields. The prize usually goes to the winner of the competition as 
well as a few runners-up who also submitted high-quality work (Archak, 2010). Thus, creative 
workers are motivated to participate in these risky competitions by the chance to win a significant 
prize (Archak, 2010; Gol et al., 2018). Further, some of the workers mentioned that the prizes for jobs 
on Topcoder are higher than on other platforms, which is one of the leading factors that motivate them 
to participate in this platform over others [P2...P4, P5, P7, P9...P12]. Per one co-pilot: “If you are an 
active member, you can earn a lot of money here in comparison with other platforms.  I know some 
members who can earn $20,000 per month, and other members can earn $2000 or $3000 on average” 
[P4]. In contrast, CanYa incentivizes workers and job providers to join to the platform by reducing 
fees to 1% (about 20 times lower than the rate of other crowdwork platforms, such as Upwork and 
99designs) [P20-P23]. According to one employee of CanYa, “This means a more efficient market 
with more money in the pockets of our freelance workers” [P21]. 
Moreover, CanYa includes some lightweight decentralized applications that can be used by anyone for 
free [P20, P22]. These apps are loosely dependent on the CanYa platform and designed to accomplish 
a particular task; for example, CanInvoice permits users to generate, save and share invoices (CanYa 
Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). These apps are intended to share the advantages of decentralized 
technologies with the broader community [P20, P22], but they also reinforce the attractiveness of the 
platform by increasing the usefulness of CanYa tokens and attracting new members (“come for the 
tool, stay for the ecosystem” being the operating slogan; CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). 
Furthermore, CanYa will be run entirely by DAO in the future, which means that users who are token 
holders will run the platform (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a; CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b). 
Therefore, they will be financially incentivized to improve their performance within the platform [P20, 
P24] and get paid with CanYa coin for doing tasks related to the running of the CanYa platform 
(McLoughlin, 2018).  
Just as the rules of financial remuneration differ significantly between the focal platforms, so do the 
payment systems. Delays in payments due to inefficiencies in the payment system constitute one of 
the major problems reported in existing crowdwork platforms (Zhang & Van Der Schaar, 2012).  In 
Topcoder, the payment system is centralized, and payment for a job is made ahead of delivery by job 
providers [P4, P13]: “Customers pay us ahead of time” [P13]. The payment to workers is made via the 
current banking system and via online transfers from Topcoder’s account to the workers’ accounts. 
Delays may occur in payment processing due to account verification issues: “It happened one or two 
times that Topcoder paid us with a delay due to some account verification issues” [P2]. This system 
also excludes workers without international bank accounts. Conversely, CanYa has a decentralized 
payment system based on the blockchain technology. CanYa created its own currency called 
CanYaCoin (CAN) [P20…, P24]. The CanYaCoin improves the platform’s payment system, 
providing a trust-less, decentralized, and hedged escrow service5 to solve the problem of currency 
inflation by maintaining the escrow value, regardless of the token price (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 
2018a; CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b).  Payments from job providers to workers can thus be made 
without an intermediary and without delays.  
                                                     
5 “The hedge is a Bancor Array Token that connects with a basket of Ethereum stable coins, such as the Digix gold token and 
the DAI USD token. This will create an internal pool in order to provide collateral to hedge the amount of cryptocurrency 
sent to the smart contract. Bancor technology will provide the price oracle for the CAN token. The outcome is that the value 
of the invoice is stable, despite fluctuations in price. Intended recipients will be paid a fixed value, but not a fixed amount of 
CAN tokens” (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a, p. 25). 
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Quality control is necessary to verify the quality of work and in performing corrective actions such as 
preventing false rejections of work and allowing for the correction of mistakes in a worker’s 
submission (Vakharia & Lease, 2015). In Topcoder, there are reviewers for each project that check the 
quality of work. These reviewers are selected and promoted from the pool of highly skilled workers 
who have at least one winning submission in their profile [P2…, P6]. Furthermore, Topcoder has 
developed scorecards to assess the quality of worker’s submissions; these are prepared for each project 
(to cater to different standards and requirements), and the workers’ submissions must be checked and 
assessed against the performance metric in the scorecards. The final score then indicates the winner of 
the competition [P5, P6]: “The reviewers choose from 1 to 5 for each question. For example, does this 
design have the Apple design standard? The final score then gives you a score of 98%. This score 
indicates the winner” [P4]. Therefore, quality control is done in a centralized process via highly 
professional workers within the platform. By contrast, CanYa does not currently have a quality control 
system, but they do have a plan to develop a review and feedback system in the future [P20, P22, 
P24]. Thus, quality control is currently performed by the job providers themselves, creating an 
environment for potential complaints by workers about unfair rejections.  
The reputation system for workers is used as an informal social control in the creative platforms for 
verifying the qualifications of workers and motivating them to abide by the rules of conduct (Horton & 
Golden, 2015). In Topcoder, the reputation system includes two parts. The first part is a color rating to 
indicate the worker’s level of experience (from novice to experienced worker), based on the number of 
competition wins: “In Topcoder we have different colors from red to grey. If you are very experienced 
and win a lot, you get red. Colors are used only in hackathons that are held by Topcoder.  The 
Hackathon usually has a big prize and is sponsored by a big company such as Google or General 
Electric” [P2, P3, P5]. The second part of the reputation system involves different roles within the 
platform, such as co-pilot and reviewer (Gol et al., 2018). Workers with sufficient experience (i.e., a 
few wins) can receive a promotion within Topcoder to a co-pilot role (allowing them to run projects) 
or to a review role (allowing them to review other workers’ submissions) [P3, P4, P6]. In addition, the 
behavior and profiles of workers are monitored so that they can be assigned to private projects 
requiring specialized skills. As one co-pilot said: “Sometimes, we have a project where we need 
machine learning and AI skills, but we have only a few members who have these skills. We reach out 
to those members and [tell] them, ‘hey, we have this project and we need your skills.’ So, we don’t 
create a challenge for everyone around the world. We reach out to one or two people who are very 
good at [the relevant] technology.” [P4].  
Unlike TopCoder, CanYa does not have a ranking system for workers based on stars or colors, but the 
CanYa DAO includes different member levels: agent, admin, and core. Agents accomplish basic tasks 
in the DAO after staking a small number of CAN tokens needed for DAO entry. Admins govern 
agents and accomplish more complicated and higher-level tasks in the DAO, which have results with 
broad impact such as approvals, curation, and arbitration. Admins need a higher stake and more 
experience in the DAO, which is demonstrated by passing a reputation threshold to ensure that they 
have socially proven their commitment to the platform. Finally, core members of the CanYa Team 
handle complex matters such as funding approvals and changes to the CanYa DAO and CanYa Core. 
As the CanYa DAO develops, admins may want to join the core level by staking a much higher 
amount. Progressively, this should lead to the CanYa DAO being governed by the DAO members and 
becoming fully decentralized (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). Members can leave the DAO and 
retrieve their stake at any time. The stake is held to avoid dishonest actors within the DAO and to 
motivate long-term commitment (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a).  Furthermore, in the future, 
CanYa is planning to run a skill proof decentralized app, which verifies the workers’ claims regarding 
their skills using other workers’ votes. Agents are rewarded for voting on the claims, and admins are 
paid to prove the claims (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). Therefore, members, instead of the 
platform owner, will play a vital role in the functioning of the reputation system. 
In sum, in centralized work control, the platform owner plays a vital role in setting up the structure and 
mechanisms through which governance by the platform is done (e.g., in Topcoder, a layered structure 
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of project managers, co-pilots and reviewers performs work control on behalf of the platform owner). 
Conversely, in decentralized work control, all members with a stake in the platform play a critical role 
in participating in governance by the platform. Such decentralized control procedures take time to 
develop; as we can see from our data, many of the essential work control mechanisms in place in 
Topcoder are still under development in CanYa. 
4.1.3 Work coordination 
As highlighted above, coordination involves the managing of dependencies among crowdwork 
activities, such as dependencies between tasks or between parties (based on Crowston, 1997; Malone 
& Crowston, 1994; Kittur et al., 2013). Work coordination involves task management, task 
interdependence management, contract management, and dispute resolution management. 
Task management refers to the management of a ‘job’ from the ‘offer’ stage to ‘submission’ to 
‘completion’ through a process that facilitates the capturing of workers’ knowledge (Vukovi, 2010). 
Topcoder usually runs complex projects in which project managers, sometimes together with co-pilots, 
create a proposal and a game plan including the number of challenges for running the project and the 
budget for each challenge. Then, if the job provider approves the proposal and game plan, the platform 
starts the project, runs the challenges, and integrates deliveries from different challenges. Finally, the 
completed project is delivered to the job provider [P3, P4, P5..., P7, P10, P11]. Therefore, the task 
management in Topcoder is centralized and is the key value-adding service Topcoder offers to job 
providers. In contrast, CanYa lacks a full task facilitation service. Thus, the platform only performs 
basic matching between job providers’ requirements and workers’ skills based on their profile 
information (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a). As such, CanYa is only able to run comparatively less 
complex jobs (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a; CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b) on the platform.   
Task interdependence management is part of task management but is worthy of separate 
consideration. It manages the interdependencies between tasks, such as splitting the complex task into 
smaller tasks, managing those subtasks and spreading them among crowdworkers with different skills 
and capabilities (Kittur et al., 2013). In Topcoder, a project manager and a co-pilot are assigned for 
each project. Together, they cover the task interdependence management based on their knowledge 
and experience, as described by a co-pilot: “My responsibility as a co-pilot is to take a project and 
divide it into small pieces and run the challenges. In each challenge, we have to create a very small 
part of the whole project” [P5]. A project manager explained the rules of breaking projects into 
smaller tasks: “It’s based on experience. As a typical rule, I try to run challenges that I think the 
developers in their free time might be able to work on and get done in 3 days” [P14]. In contrast, in 
CanYa there is currently no task interdependence management.  
Contract management is considered another essential governance mechanism and a core platform 
functionality for managing the interdependencies among workers and job providers and coordinating 
the work plan, including deadlines, job conditions, and delivery format (Agrawal et al., 2015; 
Vakharia & Lease, 2015; Howcroft & Bergvall-Kåreborn, 2018). In Topcoder, there is no contract 
between a job provider and a worker; instead, the contract is made between the Topcoder as a platform 
owner and the job provider for each project. The contract covers worker payments and Topcoder 
consulting fees [P4, P6, P7]. There can also be a contract between Topcoder and the highly skilled 
workers in the co-pilot and reviewer roles [ P3, P4, P6, P7, P14] but no contract between regular 
workers (participants in the competitions) and Topcoder. Such a contract between Topcoder and co-
pilots/reviewers is made to protect the rights of the platform owner only when the project is private: 
“If the project is open, we don’t sign any contract, but when the project is private, we should assign a 
document, scan it and send it to Topcoder. [The document states] that I cannot take this project as a 
private job off the platform and I cannot go to another company and say, for example, ‘hey, I did this 
project before for company X’…” [P4]. CanYa uses Can Escrow as a contract between job providers 
and workers. Can Escrow is a smart contract that is used to hold the payment (secure cryptocurrency) 
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for the intended person. Entry currency is transformed to CAN before being held in escrow. The 
escrow is joined with a hedge that tries to maintain the value of the escrow in case of token price 
fluctuation (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a; CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b). A CanYa member 
explains the process as follows: “We’ve just released the escrow contract, which can release the 
exchange module to pay. So, now what we believe is that the client will come and reach out to the 
worker and then have a discussion with them [to] agree on the job, and the contract will begin” [P20]. 
Therefore, contract management is decentralized in this platform. Moreover, in the future CanYa 
intends to run some new decentralized apps including CanHire and CanJob. The CanHire app is being 
developed as a platform that allows employers to display their open vacancies. Smart contracts will be 
used in this app as the escrow of payment (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a; CanYa Services Pty. 
Ltd., 2018b). The CanJob app, also in development, will be used for small local jobs (e.g., painting, 
plumbing, etc.). Job providers will be able to insert job posts, and payments will be held in escrow. 
Any workers who complete the task will receive a review, feedback, and payment (CanYa Services 
Pty. Ltd., 2018a; CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b).  
Dispute resolution management manages the work behaviors on the platform among workers and 
job providers regarding solving complaints among them, which usually arise as a result of false 
rejections of work, low wages, and low work quality (Tate et al., 2017; Howcroft & Bergvall-
Kåreborn, 2018). Topcoder provides feedback to all workers (even non-winners) to let them know 
why their submissions were rejected or accepted [P3, P4, P7…, P10]. The platform is responsible for 
solving any problems between workers and job providers by negotiating with both of them. Moreover, 
Topcoder dedicates a forum for each project that is managed by one of Topcoder’s employees, and 
workers can talk about their issues regarding the project within that forum [P1, P2]. For example, one 
worker mentioned that: “Sometimes the project is too big in comparison with the prize. So, the workers 
complain about that. So, the project manager talks to the client and asks them to run the project in two 
challenges or increase the prize” [P5]. In higher-level disputes, for example between co-pilots and job 
providers, the project manager from Topcoder takes the responsibility to try to solve the problem, as 
one co-pilot mentioned: “Sometimes clients don’t know what they really want. I check with them 
[regarding] the requirements at first, but when they receive the final submission, they say it is not 
what we expected. So, I talk to the project manager and he talks to them. The project manager is [the 
one] who solves the problem. These problems happen a lot, especially with small clients. They don’t 
know what they really want” [P4]. CanYa has created an automatic dispute resolution system using a 
chatbot. If the chatbot cannot solve the issue, the user is connected to a DAO agent who is able to 
provide support. At the end of the conversation, the user is able to rate the DAO agent and enhance or 
diminish his/her reputation score (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018b). In addition, CanYa is in the 
process of developing a decentralized dispute resolution system that will operate through a smart 
contract that holds the payment but allows both workers and job providers to take recourse and 
negotiate in case they are not satisfied with each other’s performance. When the negotiations among 
parties are unsuccessful, each party can demand arbitration from CanYa DAO, as explained by a 
CanYa core member: “If two parties [to a dispute] can’t come to an agreement themselves, that’s 
when they are able to call app to the DAO and then rent a member of the organization. So, the DAO 
member can see all the information about the parties, and the job log will be open for him/her, but 
s/he’ll need to be quite an experienced member with our stakes” [P20].  
In sum, in centralized work coordination, the platform owner again plays a vital role in setting up the 
structure and mechanisms through which governance by the platform is done (e.g., in the layered 
structure of Topcoder, the project managers, co-pilots and reviewers also perform work coordination 
on behalf of the platform owner). Conversely, in decentralized work coordination, much of the 
coordination effort is coded into the platform architecture (e.g., smart contracts), thus reducing the 
demand for human intervention and increasing efficiency.  
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5 Discussion  
This study explored centralized and decentralized crowdwork platform governance by investigating 
Topcoder and CanYa as two examples of creative crowdwork platforms with different degrees of gov-
ernance centralization. We contribute to a better theoretical and practical understanding of crowdwork 
platform governance by delineating the mechanisms of platform control, work control and work coor-
dination, combining the ideas of governance of and by platforms (Gillespie, 2017; Gol et al., 2019). 
These mechanisms allow us to distinguish between centralized and decentralized crowdwork plat-
forms. We summarize the insights generated from our study regarding differences in centralized and 
decentralized governance modes in Table 3.  
We hope this study can serve as a guide for both researchers and practitioners, especially platform 
owners, to attract more workers and job providers and, most significantly, to maintain attractiveness in 
the eyes of job providers and workers to guarantee continued platform success in the market. As this is 
an emerging field and functioning decentralized crowdwork platforms are rare, a mature case of a 
decentralized platform does not exist. Thus, our comparison is between a start-up and a mature 
platform following different business models (matchmaking vs. competition). However, we contend 
that the key dimensions of governance in each platform (Table 3) are comparable. While some 
governance characteristics (e.g., competition-based work culture) may be directly related to the 
respective business model, other characteristics (e.g., brokered vs. direct work agreements) 
theoretically make sense for both matchmaking and competition platforms. However, we show that in 
practice the characteristics differ based on the degree of centralization of governance.  
 
Governance Dimensions  Centralized Platform Decentralized Platform 
Ownership Shareholder  Community members  
Management  Corporate management  Community leadership  
Control Top-down Bilateral peer-to-peer 
Work culture  Competition  Collaboration  
Work agreements  Brokered  Direct (via smart contracts)  
Transaction management  Intermediated  Direct (via smart contracts) 
Transaction cost High Low 
Platform service orientation  Full service Self-service 
Platforms service range   Mature full portfolio  Emergent lean portfolio  
Economic model  Transaction cost economics Tokenomics  
Table 3. Creative Crowdwork Platforms: Juxtaposing Centralized and Decentralized  
  Governance  
In Table 3, we highlight ten dimensions that allow for a systematic differentiation between creative 
crowdwork platforms based on the degree of governance centralization.  Based on our study, we 
suggest that in decentralized governance, democracy, fairness, accountability, and self-determination 
can be improved by diffusing responsibilities, ownership and decision-making rights among 
community members (based on Azfar et al., 2001; Brown & Grant, 2005). As shown in Table 3, 
ownership and management are based on community and group consent in a decentralized crowdwork 
platform and on top-down corporate decisions guided by shareholder interests in a centralized 
crowdwork platform. Governance of the platforms is, in both cases, conducted according to the 
interests of the platform owner; however, the ownership is either centralized into the hands of one 
corporation (e.g., Topcoder) or decentralized among a community (e.g., CanYa token holders).    
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Given the prominent role of the platform owner in the governance of the platform, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the owner also guides the governance done by the platform (i.e., how the platform 
controls and coordinates worker and job provider behavior). In centralized governance, a high level of 
control is concentrated in the hands of a few project managers and co-pilots, who oversee and monitor 
the progress of hundreds of workers (Brown & Grant, 2005). This tight control over process usually 
also leads to greater control over the quality of submissions (based on King, 1983). On the other hand, 
in decentralized governance, control is diffused among community members, complicating the ability 
to monitor all processes, as much of the monitoring is done in a peer-to-peer manner. While this may 
reduce misuse of power, it also increases inefficiencies in the monitoring process.  
The prominent role of the platform owner – whether a corporation or a community – also translates 
into distinct working cultures and transaction management in the platforms. In Topcoder, the culture is 
based on competition, with only one winner per job (Gol et al., 2018), while the work culture in 
CanYa is based on collaboration among members. In centralized platforms, the platform owner plays a 
vital role as an intermediary to facilitate functions such as task management, dispute resolution, and 
contract management (based on King, 1983). In decentralized platforms, such mediation services are 
left to the workers and job providers themselves. Furthermore, in decentralized platforms, work 
agreements are created by smart contracts, enabling job providers and workers to negotiate their own 
prices, work conditions, and job details and to have discussions with each other regarding the job 
without third party intervention (Atzori, 2015). Once a smart contract is in place, transaction 
management is accomplished by means of following the contract coded into software (Atzori, 2015). 
Subsequently, because of the intermediary services in centralized governance, the transaction cost is 
much higher than in decentralized governance. 
Despite these potential drawbacks of centralized crowdwork platforms, such platforms are more 
mature than decentralized crowdwork platforms, as their economic model is based on transaction cost 
economics, in which the nature of transactions influences the contracts and the allocation of economic 
functions among platform and markets (Williamson, 2008). This provides centralized platforms with a 
well-established economic model as a basis and allows them to invest in developing value-adding 
services for the workers and job providers. Meanwhile, in decentralized crowdwork platforms, the 
economic model is tokenomics. In this model, all users in the ecosystem are motivated to take part and 
receive financial benefits according to their stakes (CanYa Services Pty. Ltd., 2018a; CanYa Services 
Pty. Ltd., 2018b). The long-term sustainability of this economic model is unknown, but limited 
monetization opportunities for specific actors may hinder value-adding service development on such 
platforms.   
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we explored how creative crowdwork platforms are governed under centralized and 
decentralized modes through a comparative case study. We gained a deeper insight into centralized 
and decentralized crowdwork platform governance by utilizing the ideas of work control and work 
coordination as well as exploring the platform control element as a significant distinguishing 
characteristic between Topcoder and CanYa. We highlight ten dimensions that allow for a systematic 
differentiation between centralized and decentralized governance modes. Overall, ownership and 
management are based on community and group consent in a decentralized crowdwork platform, 
whereas they are based on top-down corporate decisions guided by shareholder interests in a 
centralized crowdwork platform. These different ownership models translate into significant 
differences in both the governance of the platforms and the governance done by the platforms.  
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